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Xref: sserve comp.org.eff.talk:9210 misc.int-property:553 comp.unix.bsd:5852 Path: sserve!manuel!munnari.oz.au!spool.mu.edu!agate!dog.ee.lbl.gov!ucbvax!virtualnews.nyu.edu!brnstnd From: brnstnd@nyu.edu (D. J. Bernstein) Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,misc.int-property,alt.suit.att-bsdi,comp.unix.bsd Subject: Re: Patents: What they are. What they aren't. Other factors. Message-ID: <11179.Sep3009.20.4892@virtualnews.nyu.edu> Date: 30 Sep 92 09:20:48 GMT References: <a=+p43j.mcgregor@netcom.com> <5204.Sep2920.32.3192@virtualnews.nyu.edu> <1992Sep30.035812.124@netcom.com> Organization: IR Lines: 99 In article <1992Sep30.035812.124@netcom.com> mcgregor@netcom.com (Scott Mcgregor) writes: > And so while a > ban against pure mental patents would not have any effect on physical > process patents, a ban that extended to this mixed arena could indeed > undermine a large amount of physical process patents. This is sheer fantasy. I oppose mental process patents. Last time in comp.patents you claimed that, under my position, the rubber-curing patent would be invalidated. In general you seem to claim that my position would invalidate all process patents. When pressed to defend your claim, you came up with the following example: ] You can perform the rubber curing process in your mind, imagining ] suitable vats, valves, connected in appropriate ways, operated for ] appropriate times under appropriate temperatures, and yielding mental ] rubber. As I said then: ``Indeed. I will fight to the death to ensure that the process of curing mental rubber is not patentable. If you have any rubber in your head please feel free to cure it... None of this has anything to do with Diamond v. Diehr, which dealt with curing *real* rubber. That's a *physical* process.'' You claim now that you ``said nothing of the kind.'' Sorry, bud: ] Again, the rule would undermine all processes patent, As I said then: ``No, it wouldn't. I am rapidly tiring of this argument. You cannot, no matter how hard you try, cure real rubber in your head. (If you can I'm sure the National Enquirer will run an article on it.) Curing rubber is therefore not a mental process. Why do you persist in saying that it is?'' > For Mr. Bernstein, this seems to not be a concern. He feels that he > can describe some applications as "inessential" and others as > "essential". But I don't think that this can be codified, and indeed, > I think that decisions such as Diamond vs. Diehr (where apparently > Bernstein would say the physical world changes are essential) Where, since you obviously haven't been paying attention, the _court_ said that. I'm not the person who invented the phrase ``insignificant post-solution activity.'' That's a legal term now. The fact that nobody can codify the meaning of ``insignificant'' doesn't stop normal people from agreeing on what it means in most cases. That's how law works. > Similarly, the changing of polarities on a cassette tape or video tape > would seem to be essential, but not on a disk drive using a > compression chip. I find it amazing that you use the word ``essential'' without saying _what_ the process is ``essential'' for. When you invent a new kind of tape, how you use the magnets is essential, because that's the invention. Using the magnets is essential for the use of this tape. If you didn't have the magnets your tape wouldn't work. When you invent a data compression algorithm, how you use tape magnets is irrelevant. The question of whether you use tape, or disk, or your head, is irrelevant. The invention has nothing to do with the magnets in this case. Using the magnets is inessential for the use of this algorithm. Is there anyone, anyone at all other than Scott, who refuses to understand this blazingly clear distinction? > But if the patent claims instead a method for increasing the > practical storage limits for a fixed area of magnetic media Ridiculous. That's not the invention in LZW. That's far, far broader than what Welch (and Miller/Wegman) invented. The scope of a patent is determined by the actual invention. > >> Now real physical effects are happening: digital signals on a control > >> line in a modem are changing, magnetic polarities in disks are > >> changing, phosphorescent displays are changing all according to > >> certain processes. > >The United States Supreme Court calls such effects ``insignificant'' > >and, rightly, ignores them in determining whether a process is > >patentable. > I believe that Mr. Bernstein is merely opining on whether the court > considers these "insignificant". I am not. I will give you exactly one reference: the USPTO article in the Official Gazette of 5 September 1989. Go look it up. Your ``belief'' is garbage. > >Put differently: If you could make a mathematical algorithm patentable > >simply by adding ``and then we write the result to a storage device'' to > >it, then any novice patent lawyer could turn any mathematical algorithm > >into something patentable. This would defeat the entire purpose of > >prohibiting such patents. > Indeed, this is the Diamond vs. Diehr reasoning in reverse. My comments, above, are a direct paraphrase of Supreme Court statements. They are not the ``reverse'' of anything. Please learn something about the law, Scott. ---Dan