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Xref: sserve comp.org.eff.talk:9267 misc.int-property:564 comp.unix.bsd:5936 Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk,misc.int-property,alt.suit.att-bsdi,comp.unix.bsd Path: sserve!manuel!munnari.oz.au!uunet!ftpbox!mothost!citi.prds.cdx.mot.com!dan From: dan@cae.prds.cdx.mot.com (Dan Breslau) Subject: Re: Patents: What they are. What they aren't. Other factors. Message-ID: <1992Oct1.134749.5671@cae.prds.cdx.mot.com> Organization: none References: <1992Sep26.161204.24573@rwwa.COM> <BvBp1v.16J@lerami.lerctr.org> <10880.Sep3008.43.0892@virtualnews.nyu.edu> <1992Oct1.090209.9474@netcom.com> Date: Thu, 1 Oct 1992 13:47:49 GMT Lines: 70 mcgregor@netcom.com (Scott Mcgregor) writes: >In article <10880.Sep3008.43.0892@virtualnews.nyu.edu> brnstnd@nyu.edu (D. J. Bernstein) writes: >>If I show you two physical processes you can easily tell whether they're >>the same. They achieve the same physical result---moving things around, >>changing one chemical into another, whatever---in the same way. Patent >>law is founded upon the principle that you can tell when two processes >>are the same. The USPTO has to be able to tell in order to grant a >>patent. The courts have to be able to tell in order to determine >>infringement. >I agree with Mr. Bernstein on this point. >>If I show you two mental processes you won't have a clue whether they're >>the same. >I agree with him here as well. >>The same remains true even if you attach ``insignificant post-solution >>activity'' (that's another legal term, despite Scott's claims to the >>contrary) to a mental process. If the physical applications of two >>mental processes are essential (curing rubber, developing film) then you >>can see whether they do the same thing. If the physical applications are >>inessential (writing bits to disk, or tape, or memory, or your head, or >>reading data from a similar place) then this test disappears. >At this point I disagree. The minute you apply it to disk or tape or >memory to can in fact test if the inputs (i.e. physical state of the >input media or signals on the input lines) were the same, you can tell >if the outputs were the same (ditto), and you can tell if the equipment >mediating the transformation (a computer in this case) were the same. >You can check that the time to perform the transformation was the >same. The accuracy, etc. At this point, you can use the physical >process rules Bernstein gave in his first example and make a >conclusion as to whether this is the same physical process or not. Now >you might name it something different, say "a computer controlled >process for converting an electronic digital signal into a shorter >signal without sacrificing information content" as opposed to calling >it LZW or MW which focusses on the intermediate state and not the >final state. You would not patent LZW per se, but the transformation, >and you might give LZW as a suggested implementation. MW would be >another, equivalent transformation. This is just as if a patent describes a >bicycle, and it gave the suggested implementation of the seat as >leather, but you use naugahide. >When a patent is stated in these terms it *IS* a PHYSICAL patent, >precisely because it is testable in physical terms, even if some of >the steps along the way involve computations that can be performed >mentally as well as mechanically or electronicly. It ceases being a >mental process patent because it is testable, and that testability is >what makes the physical pre and post algorithm work "essential" and >not inessential. Because that's exactly where the benfit lies: in a >disk that can store more, or a faster modem--not in a particular >intermediate state that is invisible. It's not hard to imagine that within our lifetimes, the brain will be readable as a medium also. (Some progress has already been made in this area.) Do you mean that when that happens, there won't be any "mental processes" at all? Regardless of that problem, it's ridiculous to claim that the end result of LZW is a rearrangement of the polarity of electrons. The end result is the transformation of information, regardless of the medium. This is the essence of what algorithms are. Dan Breslau dan@codex.com Disc claimer: "Hey! That's my floppy!"